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ABSTRACT
The main shortage of principle component analysis (PCA)
based anomaly detection models is their interpretability. In
this paper, our goal is to propose an interpretable PCA-
based model for anomaly detection and interpretation. The
propose ASPCAmodel constructs principal components with
sparse and orthogonal loading vectors to represent the ab-
normal subspace, and uses them to interpret detected anoma-
lies. Our experiments on a synthetic dataset and two real
world datasets showed that the proposed ASPCA models
achieved comparable detection accuracies as the PCAmodel,
and can provide interpretations for individual anomalies.
Keywords
Anomaly detection, PCA, Anomaly interpretation, sparsity,
optimization
1. INTRODUCTION
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) is one of the best-
known statistical analysis techniques for detecting anomalies
and has been applied to many kinds of data, such as network
intrusion detection, failure detection in production systems,
and so on [4, 21, 16, 11]. In these domains, pinpointing
the sources of detected anomalies is also very important for
real applications such as diagnosing failures and recovering
systems/networks. Hence, for each detected anomaly, an
ideal model should also be able to interpret the reasons of
its detection, which we refer to as the problem of anomaly
interpretation.
Traditional PCA-based anomaly detection models are not
suitable for anomaly interpretation [22, 17], as they judge
whether a data instance is an anomaly or not based on the
length of its projection on the abnormal subspace spanned
by the less significant principal components, and there is no
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direct mapping between PCA’s dimensionality-reduced sub-
space and the original feature space. Existing approaches
[22] added a separated interpretation step to solve this prob-
lem by using techniques such as decision trees. However
such indirect interpretation often failed to reveal the true
causes of the anomalies detected by PCA-based methods
[17]. Another recent work [11] proposed the joint sparse
PCA (JSPCA) model to identify a low-dimensional approx-
imation of the abnormal subspace, so that all anomalies can
be localized onto a small subset of original feature variables.
However, for individual anomaly interpretation, especially
anomalies of different types, we need a more accurate and
direct way of interpretation.
This paper aims to design an interpretable PCA-based
anomaly detection model. Our key observation is that if
we manage to construct principal components (PCs) with
sparse and orthogonal loading vectors to represent the ab-
normal subspace, a detected anomaly can be interpreted
by identifying the set of such PCs on which the anomaly
has large projection values. We propose interpretable Ab-
normal subspace sparse PCA (ASPCA) models for
anomaly detection and interpretation in this paper, and
make the following two contributions.
First, we formulate two objective functions for ASPCA:
one extracts the most significant sparse orthogonal PCs first,
and the other extracts the least significant sparse orthogonal
PCs first, which prioritizes the sparsity of the abnormal sub-
space. To the best of our knowledge, the proposed ASPCA
models are the first PCA-based models that are suitable
for individual anomaly detection and interpretation. Sec-
ond, we propose an optimization method for ASPCA models
with a semidefinite programming (SDP) relaxation step and
a global sparsity optimization step. Our experiments on a
synthetic dataset and two real world datasets showed that
the proposed ASPCA models achieved comparable detection
accuracies as the PCA model, and can provide interpreta-
tions for individual anomalies.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
introduces the proposed ASPCAmodels. Section 3 describes
the optimization methods for ASPCA models. Section 4
presents a comprehensive experimental evaluation. Section 5
discusses the related work. Finally, Section 6 provides some
concluding remarks.
2. RELATED WORK
PCA is mostly known as a dimension reduction tool [12],
but it is also widely used as an anomaly detection method
[6, 4]. Wei Xu et al. used this technique to analyze logs
and detect anomalies on a game server, Hadoop File Sys-
tem (HDFS) [22], and Google’s production system [21]. Ry-
ohei Fujimaki et al. used kernel PCA on the Spacecraft
Anomaly Detection Problem [7]. People have implemented
this technique on network intrusion detection [16, 15, 11, 19].
Anukool Lakhina et al. applied this technique on the prob-
lem of network flood monitoring using PCA on the matrix of
time and Origin-Destination pairs [16, 15]. Firstly, they used
the volume of communication [15] in their model, and then
they extent their model with the entropy of communication
volumes and applied PCA with multiple subspace [16]. Ling
Huang et al. tried to design an online PCA-based detection
method for scalability and communication efficiency [9, 8].
One of the major disadvantages of PCA as a dimension
reduction tool is its poor interpretability. Ian Jolliffe et al.
introduced the concept of sparse PCA which adds a con-
straint on the sparsity of loading vectors [13]. Since, vari-
ous methods solving the sparse PCA problem were proposed
in the literature, for example [23] and [5]. Hui Zou et al.
transformed the sparse PCA problem to a regression-type
problem with an elastic net regularization, which could be
solved by an alternating minimization scheme [23]. Alexan-
dre d’Aspremont et al. proposed a semi-definite program-
ming (SDP) relaxation to the sparse PCA optimization prob-
lem [5].
PCA-based anomaly detection methods also suffer from
the shortage of interpretability [17, 22]. Ruoyi Jiang et al.
introduced the joint sparse PCA method for anomaly local-
ization inspired by sparse PCA [10, 11] , and they followed
the alternating minimization framework [23] to solve the op-
timization problem [11]. Wei Xu et al. also tried to inter-
pret the results returned by a PCA anomaly detection model
with decision trees trained by the data labeled by the PCA
model [22], which as shown in our experimental results, can
be misleading and fail to reveal the true reason behind the
PCA model.
3. PCA FOR ANOMALY DETECTION AND
INTERPRETATION
3.1 Notations
Bold uppercase letters such asX denote a matrix and bold
lowercase letters such as x denote a column vector. Greek
letters such as λ, µ are coefficients. ||X||F is the Frobenius
norm of X, and ||X||1,1 is the L1,1 norm of X as ||X||1,1 =
1|X|1T .
A dataset is represented as an n×p data matrix D, where
each row vector corresponds to a p-dimensional data in-
stance, and each column vector corresponds to a feature
variable. A = DTD is D’s covariance matrix. Tr(A) rep-
resents the trace of matrix A. Card(A) denotes the cardi-
nality (number of non-zero elements) of matrix A. I is the
identity matrix. Sp is the set of all symmetric semidefinite
matrices in Rp×p.
3.2 PCA for Anomaly Detection
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) is a dimensionality-
reduction technique that captures the highest variance of a
multi-dimensional dataset in a lower dimensional subspace
defined by a set of orthogonal eigen vectors. Given a p-
dimensional dataset, a detection model can be constructed
by forming a “normal subspace” (defined by the first k prin-
cipal components returned by PCA) and an “abnormal sub-
space”(the remaining subspace by removing the normal sub-
space). Since the normal subspace captures the highest vari-
ance of the dataset, PCA-based detection methods assume
that this k-subspace corresponds to the normal trends of the
dataset, and all normal data tends to have almost zero length
projection on the abnormal subspace. Therefore, given a
p-dimensional data, the model can detect whether it is a
anomaly or not based on whether it is primarily expressed
by the normal or abnormal subspace [17].
More formally, let V1 = (v1, · · · ,vk) be the normal sub-
space defined by the first k principal components with v1, · · · ,
vk being the orthogonal loading vectors, andV2 = (vk+1, · · · ,
vp) be the abnormal subspace defined by the remaining p−k
principal components with vk+1, · · · ,vp being the orthogo-
nal loading vectors of these PCs. Given a p-dimensional
data y, its residual yˆ is defined as:
yˆ = y −V1V
T
1 y. (1)
The squared length of yˆ, called the squared prediction er-
ror (SPE), is the metric to indicate whether y is an anomaly
or not. The larger SPE is, the more likely y is an anomaly.
3.3 Anomaly Interpretation
When the SPE score of a given instance y is over a pre-
defined threshold, y is considered as an anomaly. It is then
important to understand where the abnormality of y comes
from, i.e., what anomalous feature behaviors of y are more
responsible for distinguishing y from normal data. We call
this problem as Anomaly Interpretation. The anomaly
interpretation for PCA is difficult, as there is no direct map-
ping between PCA’s dimensionality-reduced subspace and
the original feature space for anomaly [17]. In other words,
the length of yˆ can be used to detect anomaly, whereas in-
terpreting yˆ directly is meaningless.
Given the normal subspace V1 and abnormal subspace
V2, we can rewrite yˆ as follows:
yˆ = y −V1V
T
1 y = V2V
T
2 y. (2)
To design an interpretable PCA-based anomaly detection
model, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 3.1. Given V2 = (vk+1, · · · ,vp), where
vk+1, · · · ,vp are orthogonal loading vectors, SPE can be ex-
pressed by
SPE = yˆT yˆ =
p∑
i=k+1
(vTi y)
2. (3)
Proof.
SPE = yˆT yˆ = yTV2V
T
2 V2V
T
2 y
= (yTV2)(V
T
2 V2)(V
T
2 y) = (V
T
2 y)
T (VT2 y)
=
p∑
i=k+1
(vTi y)
2.
(4)
In other words, SPE is equal to the square sum of y’ scalar
projection on each abnormal PCs, so that we can identify
the set of PCs that are responsible for the abnormality in-
dicated by high projection values. Unfortunately, these PCs
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Figure 1: Synthetic data and loading matrices ob-
tained by PCA and ASPCA
are still difficult to interpret, since each abnormal PC is
complicated as it is a linear combination of all feature vari-
ables. To make them interpretable, we have to make these
abnormal PCs sparse, i.e., each represented by a few feature
variables. Hence, our key observation is that if we manage to
extract PCs with sparse and orthogonal loading vectors to
represent abnormal subspace, these loading vectors can be
used to detect and interpret anomalies. The orthogonality
guarantees that Eqn. 4 holds, so that the abnormality can
be translated to high projection values on a set of abnormal
PCs, while the sparsity guarantees that these abnormal PCs
are interpretable. We call the above method as the Abnor-
mal Subspace Sparse PCA (ASPCA) method. Now we
use an example to illustrate this idea.
We synthesized a dataset with 500 normal records and 15
anomalies (first 100 normal records are shown in Figure 1a).
Each data record has 7 features named from A to G, and the
normal records were generated with four patterns, A ≈ B,
D ≈ C + A, F ≈ 0, and G ≈ 0. The anomalies were gener-
ated as three categories by breaking the first three patterns,
respectively. The loading matrix of PCs obtained by PCA
is shown in Figure 1b, where the last four PCs can be used
to detect anomalies but difficult to interpret. Now, if we can
make the loading vectors of last four PCs sparse and or-
thogonal as shown in Figure 1c, they can be used to detect
and interpret anomalies simultaneously. Now, the interpre-
tation of a detected anomaly can be conducted in two steps.
First, we can identify the set of projections that contribute
the most for a high SPE score according to Eqn. 4. Then,
we can interpret these projections one by one, by identifying
which original feature variables are responsible for each pro-
jection, and how each projection triggers a high SPE score.
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Figure 2: Loading matrix obtained by JSPCA
Recently, Jiang et al. [11] proposed a joint sparse PCA
(JSPCA) model to achieve a sparse representation of the ab-
normal subspace too. The main idea was to identify a low-
dimensional approximation of the abnormal subspace using
a subset of feature variables, where all abnormal PCs are
represented by the same subset of feature variables as shown
in Figure 2. Although JSPCA can identify the set of fea-
tures that distinguish the anomalies, it has two limitations
that fail to meet our goals. First, the features identified by
JSPCA are optimized for all anomalies as a whole. In partic-
ular, if anomalies are of different types, which is a common
case for domains such as network intrusion detection or sys-
tem failure detection, they should be interpreted by differ-
ent sets of features inherently. As an unsupervised method,
JSPCA cannot assume that anomalies in the dataset are of
the same type, and cannot handle them well if they indeed
are of different types. Second, JSPCA can only identify the
important features for anomaly detection, but no direct in-
terpretation as why anomalies are detected.
3.4 Abnormal Subspace Sparse PCA
Now we need to formulate the objective function of the
Abnormal Subspace Sparse PCA (ASPCA) problem. The
recently studied sparse PCA framework [5] adds a sparsity
constraint on the principal components (PCs). However, we
cannot use this framework directly to solve our problem.
The main reason is that the sparse PCA framework usually
does not enforce orthogonality on the resultant sparse PCs.
Consequently, the resultant sparse PCs cannot be used to
define the normal and abnormal subspaces, as the abnormal
PCs are not the orthogonal complement of the normal PCs.
By enforcing orthogonality, sparse PCA can be used to
solve our ASPCA problem, which we denote as forward AS-
PCA (shorted as ASPCA-F). Given a covariance matrix A
and a sparsity constraint constant k, for each i = 1, ..., p,
ASPCA-F tries to solve:
argmax
vi
vTi Avi
s.t. vTi vi = 1, v
T
i vj = 0 ∀1 ≤ j < i, Card(vi) ≤ k.
(5)
The last d loading vectors obtained by solving Eqn. 5 are
used for detecting and interpreting anomalies.
One of the drawbacks of the ASPCA-F framework is that
the last abnormal PCs tend to have poor sparsity. To sovle
this problem, we propose a Backward ASPCA framework
(shorted as ASPCA-B) that extracts the least significant or-
thogonal PCs first, which prioritizes the optimization of the
sparsity of the abnormal subspace. To see how it works, we
first show that the process of standard PCA can be reversed,
so that eigen vectors with smaller eigen values are extracted
first by the following proposition.
Proposition 3.2. Given a covariance matrixA = DTD,
if we have already extracted the eigen vectors vk+1,vk+2, ....,vn
with the n−k−1 smallest eigen values, and remaining eigen
vectors are v1,v2, ....,vk with eigen values λ1 ≥ λ2 ≥ ... ≥
λk of A, the solution of Eqn. 6 is the eigen vector with the
eigen value λk.
argmin
v
vTAv
s.t.vTv = 1, vTvi = 0 ∀k < i ≤ n
(6)
Proof. We project v on (v1, ...,vn), v =
∑n
i=1
αivi =∑k
i=1
αivi, where αi = v
Tvi. As v
T
i vj = 0, i 6= j, we have
vTv =
∑k
i=1 α
2
i = 1. Then,
vTAv
=(
k∑
i=1
αivi)(
k∑
i=1
αiAvi) = (
k∑
i=1
αivi)(
k∑
i=1
αiλivi)
=
k∑
i=1
α2iλiv
T
i vi +
k∑
i=1
k∑
j=1,j 6=i
αiαjλjv
T
i vj
=
k∑
i=1
α2iλi
As λi ≥ λk, i ≤ k, we know v
TAv =
∑k
i=1
α2iλi ≥∑k
i=1 α
2
iλk = λk. And we know minv v
TAv ≤ vTkAvk =
λk, so minv v
TAv = λk.
With the optimum vˆ =
∑k
i=1
αˆivi, we have:
λk −
k∑
i=1
αˆ2iλi =
k∑
i=1
αˆ2i (λk − λi) = 0
λk − λi ≤ 0, i < k
So, we know that αˆi 6= 0 only if λi = λk. Hence, vˆ is a
linear combination of the eigen vectors with eigen value λk,
and vˆ must be an eigen vector with eigen value λk too.
Obviously, the proposition also holds for k = n. Together
we see that using Eqn. 6, eigen vectors can be calculated in
an increasing order of eigen values. Now, we add a sparsity
constraint to Eqn. 6 and form the objective function for our
ASPCA-B framework as follows.
Given a covariance matrix A and a sparsity constraint
constant k, for each i = 1, ..., d, our ASPCA-B framework
tries to solve:
argmin
vi
vTi Avi
s.t. vTi vi = 1, v
T
i vj = 0 ∀1 ≤ j < i, Card(vi) ≤ k.
(7)
When we extract d loading vectors v1...vd to span a sub-
space Sa, we make sure that the orthogonal complement of
Sa has major variance for describing the normal patterns in
the dataset, so that Sa is the abnormal subspace and the re-
sultant d sparse principal components can be used to detect
and interpret anomalies.
4. METHODOLOGY
We derive a solution for Eqn. 5 following the semidefinite
programming (SDP) relaxation framework proposed by [5].
We then modify it to solve Eqn. 7. Finally,we further opti-
mize the sparsity of all the obtained abnormal components
with the constraint of spanning the same subspace using the
alternating minimization scheme inspired by [23].
Solving ASPCA-F with SDP Relaxation.
We first transform Eqn. 5 without the orthogonality con-
straint vTj vi = 0,∀1 ≤ j < i to Eqn.8 through a SDP relax-
ation.
argmax
Xi∈S
p
Tr(AXi)
s.t. Xi  0, rank(Xi) = 1, T r(Xi) = 1, Card(Xi) < k
2
(8)
whereXi is a positive semi-definitive matrix with the con-
straint rank(Xi) = 1, which can be uniquely decomposed as
Xi = viv
T
i . With Xi = viv
T
i , Tr(Xi) = 1 is equivalent to
vTi vi = 1, Card(Xi) ≤ k
2 is equivalent to Card(vi) ≤ k,
and we have vTi Avi = Tr(A(viv
T
i )) = Tr(AXi).
Now let Vi = (v1,v2, ...,vi) and Ri = ViV
T
i , the or-
thogonality constraint vTj vi = 0,∀1 ≤ j < i is equivalent
to ||VTi−1vi||
2
2 = 0, and ||V
T
i−1vi||
2
2 = v
T
i Vi−1V
T
i−1vi =
Tr(Ri−1Xi) = 0. Similarly as in [5], we relax Card(Xi) <
k2 to ||Xi||1,1 < k and move it to the objective function with
a coefficient λ. Finally, the non-convex constraint rank(Xi) =
1 is dropped, and we have an objective function that can be
solved by semidefinite programming (SDP) as in Eqn. 9.
argmax
Xi∈S
p
Tr(AXi)− λ||Xi||1,1
s.t. Xi  0, T r(Xi) = 1, T r(Ri−1Xi) = 0
(9)
As rank(Xi) might not be 1, so we use the dominant
eigenvector of Xi as the approximate solution for vi.
Solving ASPCA-B with SDP Relaxation.
To solve Eqn. 5, following the same steps above, we can
get Eqn. 10, which is still a convex programming problem
and can be solved by semidefinite programming (SDP).
argmin
Xi∈S
p
Tr(AXi) + λ||Xi||1,1
s.t. Xi  0, T r(Xi) = 1, T r(Ri−1Xi) = 0
(10)
Global Sparsity Optimization.
Let V = (v1, ...,vd) be the set of sparse loading vectors
extracted by solving Eqn. 9 or Eqn. 10, which is also a set
of basis vectors spanning the abnormal subspace. Notice
that for any set of basis vectors c1, ..., cd spanning the same
subspace, we have
SPE =
d∑
i=1
(vTi y)
2 =
d∑
i=1
(cTi y)
2 (11)
Hence, we can employ a global sparsity optimization step
to make the basis vectors of the same abnormal subspace
sparser. To this end, we form the following optimization
problem on an orthogonal transformation matrix X,
argmin
X
||VX||1,1
s.t. XTX = I
(12)
Let C = VX, we transform this problem to the following
regression problem,
argmin
X,C
||V −CXT ||F + µ||C||1,1
s.t. XTX = I
(13)
Eqn. 13 can be solved by using the alternating minimiza-
tion scheme as in [23], with initial X being an identity ma-
trix. Initially, we set µ = ||V||F /||VX||1,1 to emphasize
more on the sparsity objective, and gradually degrade µ to
a small value to ensure C spanning the same subspace as V
through the last iterations.
Adding the global sparsity optimization step to ASPCA-
F and ASPCA-B, we have two new models ASPCA-FG and
ASPCA-BG, respectively. Algorithms 1 and 2 summarize
the entire optimization process, where A is the covariance
matrix of the input dataset, d is the number of sparse prin-
cipal components extracted from the abnormal subspace,
max iter is the number of iterations for the global sparsity
optimization, and the output loading matrix V contains d
orthogonal and sparse loading vectors for detecting and in-
terpreting anomalies.
Algorithm 1 Forward Abnormal Subspace Sparse PCA
with Global Optimization (ASPCA-FG)
Input: A, d, λ, and max iter
Output: V
1: for i = 1 to p do
2: Vi−1 ← (v1,v2...vi−1);
3: Ri−1 ← Vi−1V
T
i−1;
4: Optimize vi with given A, Ri−1 according to Eqn. 9
using SDP;
5: end for
6: V← (vp−d+1, ...vp);
7: Optimize X, C with given V, max iter according to
Eqn. 13 using the alternating minimization scheme;
8: V← CX;
9: return V;
Algorithm 2 Backward Abnormal Subspace Sparse PCA
with Global Optimization (ASPCA-BG)
Input: A, d, λ, and max iter
Output: V
1: for i = 1 to d do
2: Vi−1 ← (v1,v2...vi−1);
3: Ri−1 ← Vi−1V
T
i−1;
4: Optimize vi with given A, Ri−1 according to Eqn. 10
using SDP;
5: end for
6: V← (v1,v2...vd);
7: Optimize X, C with given V, max iter according to
Eqn. 13 using the alternating minimization scheme;
8: V← CX;
9: return V;
5. EXPERIMENT
5.1 Datasets
Our proposed ASPCA models were evaluated on the syn-
thetic data introduced in Section 2, a medical datasetBreast-
Cancer, and a network intrusion detection datasetKDD99.
Breast Cancer Wisconsin (Diagnostic) Data Set [1]
provides features to distinguish malignant and benign tu-
mors. The features describe characteristics of the cell nuclei
present in a digitized image of a fine needle aspirate (FNA)
of a breast mass. As there are plenty cells for a breast mass,
the features are three important statistics (mean, standard
error, and worst value) on 10 features for each cell: radius,
texture, perimeter, area, smoothness, compactness, concav-
ity, concave points, symmetry and fractal dimension. There
are 357 benign records, and we kept the first 10 malignant
records to transform the classification task to an anomaly
detection task, same as the other works [14, 3] did. All 30
real-valued features were deducted by the mean values and
linearly scaled to [−1, 1].
KDD 99 Intrusion Dataset [2] is a widely used data
for anomaly and intrusion detection. Each instance is a con-
nection record classified as normal or one of 22 classes of
attacks. Attacks fall into four main groups: DoS, Remote-
to-local, User-to-root, and Probe. We chose all normal and
part of the abnormal records in 10% KDD99 datasets as
shown in Table 1 as picking the first 500 records on smurf
,neptune, back, teardrop, satan, ipsweep, and portsweep and
all records on other attacking types. The number of records
for each type are shown in brackets in Table 1 too.We fol-
lowed a similar preprocessing procedure as in [11]. There are
41 features including seven categorical features which were
mapped into distinct positive integers from 0 to m−1 (m is
the number of states for the categorical feature). For exam-
ple, 0 to 2 in protocol type stands for TCP, UDP, and ICMP.
Logarithmic scaling was applied on duration, src bytes, and
dst bytes, and all features were deducted by the mean values
and linearly scaled to [−1, 1].
5.2 Methodology
We compared our proposed ASPCA models with the stan-
dard PCA model for detection and sparsity performance,
and with two state-of-the-art analytical models on PCA re-
sults: the JSPCA model [11] and a decision tree model used
in [22] for interpretation performance. For the decision tree
model, we formed the training set with all predicted normal
records and anomalies returned by our ASPCA model as
negative and positive samples, respectively. Then the deci-
sion trees were trained using the CART model from MAT-
LAB and trimmed manually for the best interpretation.
The parameters used in our model were listed in Table 2
and discussed in Section 5.4. The number of PCs used in
PCA equals the total number of features minus the number
of abnormal PCs for all datasets. The results of JSPCA on
the synthetic data were obtained by choosing the best per-
formed parameters, and we directly reported their results
on KDD99 in [11]. Note that, our ASPCA models make no
assumptions on the anomalies in the dataset, and we built
one model on the entire KDD99 dataset with anomalies from
all different categories, whereas JSPCA built four models on
KDD99, each including anomalies for a single major attack-
ing category [11].
Finally, we implemented all methods with MATLAB and
Table 1: Statistics of KDD99 and the relevant fea-
tures identified by JSPCA
Categories
#
Records
Types
Relevant Features
(JSPCA)
Normal 97,277
DoS 2,264
smurf(500),
neptune(500),
back(500),
teardrop(500),
pod(264)
service,
src bytes,
dst bytes,
count, srv count,
dst host count,
dst host srv count
Probe 1,731
satan(500),
ipsweep(500),
portsweep(500),
nmap(231)
source bytes
U2R 52
buffer overflow(30),
loadmodule(9),
perl(3), rootkit(10)
duration,
src bytes,
dst bytes,
dst host count,
dst host srv count
R2L 1,126
ftp write(8),
guess passwd(53),
imap(12),
multihop(7),
phf(4), spy(2),
warezclient(1,020),
warezserver(20)
duration, service,
src bytes,
dst bytes,
dst host count,
dst host srv count
Table 2: Parameters
# abnormal PCs λ
Synthetic 4 5
Breast-Cancer 10 5
KDD99 35 100
CVX, and performed all experiments on a laptop computer
with 16 GB memory and a Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-4870HQ
2.50GHz CPU.
5.3 Experimental Results
5.3.1 Detection Evaluation
We first compared the various ASPCA models with the
standard PCAmodel on the anomaly detection performance.
Because all models can obtain a perfect ROC curve for the
Synthetic data, we only show the ROC curves on Breast-
Cancer and KDD99 in Figure 3a and Figure 3b, respectively.
Note that, since ASPCA-F and ASPCA-FG use the same
abnormal subspace to detect anomalies, their ROC curves
are identical which are labeled as ASPCA-F(G). Similarly,
the ROC curves of ASPCA-B and ASPCA-BG are labeled
as ASPCA-B(G). From Figure 3a, we can see that our pro-
posed ASPCA-F(G) and ASPCA-B(G) models performed
similarly or even better than PCA on anomaly detection for
both datasets.
5.3.2 Sparsity Evaluation
The next set of experiments were designed to compare
the sparsity of the loading matrix generated by various AS-
PCA models and we used the result of PCA as our baseline.
We used three metrics to evaluate the sparsity of the load-
ing matrix of the abnormal PCs, namely, ||V ||1,1, Card0.1
(number of entries with absolute values bigger than 0.1),
and Card0.01 (number of entries with absolute values big-
ger than 0.01), and showed the results in Table 3. We can
see that all ASPCA models improved the sparsity of the
FPR
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Figure 3: ROC curves
Table 3: Sparsity on Synthetic data, Breast-Cancer,
and KDD99
dataset method ||V ||1,1 card0.1 card0.01
Synthetic
PCA 7.07 16 24
ASPCA-F 5.54 9 9
ASPCA-B 5.31 8 8
ASPCA-FG 5.54 9 9
ASPCA-BG 5.31 8 8
Breast-Cancer
PCA 34.22 111 237
ASPCA-F 17.23 33 50
ASPCA-B 12.31 18 18
ASPCA-FG 16.50 36 63
ASPCA-BG 12.31 18 18
KDD99
PCA 97.33 248 691
ASPCA-F 55.01 96 265
ASPCA-B 54.52 101 215
ASPCA-FG 42.77 58 159
ASPCA-BG 43.05 57 157
loading matrix greatly over the baseline. For all datasets,
the ASPCA-B model achieved better sparsity performance
than the ASPCA-F model. The global optimization step im-
proved ||V ||1,1 values for both models on Breast-Cancer and
KDD99. However, in terms of cardinality, ASPCA-FG per-
formed worse than ASPCA-F on Breast-Cancer. The global
optimization step achieved the largest sparsity improvement
on KDD99, as it has more abnormal PCs than the other
two datasets leaving more room for the global optimization.
Overall, the ASPCA-BG model achieved the best sparsity
performance.
The loading matrices returned by PCA and ASPCA-B
(the other three ASPCA models have very similar results)
on the Synthetic data are shown in Figure 1, and the loading
matrices returned by PCA, ASPCA-F, ASPCA-B, ASPCA-
FG, ASPCA-BG on Breast-Cancer and KDD99 are shown
in Figure 4. We can see that ASPCA-F usually leaves some
loading vectors with poor sparsity towards the end, which
should be avoided as they are part of abnormal subspace.
On the contrary, ASPCA-B leaves the loading vectors not so
sparse towards the beginning, which need no interpretation
as they belong to the normal subspace.
5.3.3 Interpretation Evaluation
Now we evaluate the interpretation performance of the
ASPCA-BG model, as it has the best sparsity performance.
Since we want to see how true anomalies are interpreted
by our model, we selected a threshold value on SPE to en-
sure most of the true anomalies are detected. We show the
threshold values, false positive rates (FPR), and true posi-
tive rates (TPR) for all three datasets in Table 4.
Synthetic Data: The four abnormal PCs and the pro-
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Figure 4: Loading matrix of PCs of Breast-Cancer (Top) and KDD99 (Bottom) obtained by PCA, ASPCA-F,
ASPCA-B, ASPCA-FG, and ASPCA-BG from left to right
Table 4: SPE Threshold
SPE threshold TPR FPR
Synthetic 0.25 1 0
Breast-Cancer 0.1003 1 0.0476
KDD99 0.5075 0.8516 0.0657
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Figure 5: Heatmap of projection values of anomalies
on abnormal PCs for Synthetic Data
jection values of 15 anomalies on these PCs are shown in
Table 5 and Figure 5, respectively. As shown in Table 5,
the first three PCs correspond to the rules of D ≈ C + A,
A ≈ B, and F ≈ 0, respectively. The anomalies break-
ing these rules indeed have large projection values on the
corresponding PCs. Thus, our ASPCA-BG model can not
only identify the set of features that are responsible for an
anomaly, but also tell the cause of the anomaly, ı.e., breaking
the rules indicated by the abnormal PCs.
JSPCA also successfully identified the relevant features
(A,B,D, F ) as suggested in Figure 2. However, it cannot
tell the source of each individual anomaly. Unlike JSPCA,
our ASPCA models make no assumptions on whether there
are anomalies present in the dataset for model training.
Keeping only normal data from the Synthetic dataset, the
ASPCA-BG model found four abnormal PCs with loading
vectors (0.31, 0.31, 0.64, 0.64, 0, 0, 0)T , (−0.71, 0.71, 0, 0, 0, 0)T ,
(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0)T , and (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1)T , which are very
similar to the ones in Table 5. Using these abnormal PCs,
we can successfully detect and interpret anomalies as well.
Table 5: Components on Synthetic Data
Index Components
1 0.3099 A + 0.3122 B + 0.6370 C - 0.6330 D
2 0.7095 A - 0.7047 B
3 1 F
4 1 G
F
-0.2172
15/0/500
3/0/0
B
1.377
11/0/500
4/0/0
D
2.197
8/0/500F
0.3735
7/0/500
1/0/0
1/0/0
C
-0.8784
6/0/500
…
3/0/464
…
3/0/36
Figure 6: Decision tree on Synthetic Data
The decision tree was shown in Figure 6, where on each
node we showed the feature and its value used to partition
the data, the number of true positives detected by ASPCA-
BG in red, the number of false positives in yellow, and the
number of normal data detected by ASPCA-BG in green.
We can see that the decision tree model needs several rules
to describe a group of anomalies which could be easily de-
scribed by a clear linear combination and a threshold. In
Figure 6, only the third type of anomalies, which has a large
absolute value on F, is easy for the decision tree model to
interpret.
Breast-Cancer: The projection values of 10 anomalies
on the abnormal PCs obtained by ASPCA-BG for Breast-
Cancer are shown in Figure 7. We can see that the malig-
nant records have two patterns: the first four records have
large projection values on the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th PCs, the
rest records have large projection values on the first PC and
moderate projection values on the 6th PC. We show these
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Figure 7: Heatmap of projection values of anomalies
on abnormal PCs of Breast-Cancer
Table 6: Components on Breast-Cancer.
Index Components
1 1 area se
2 0.9894 symmetry worst
3
0.9631 fractal dimension worst
- 0.2693 fractal dimension mean
4
0.9445 compactness worst
- 0.3286 compactness mean
6 0.8554 area worst - 0.5180 radius worst
PCs in Table 6, where coefficients in PCs less than 0.1 were
omitted. The features appearing in the 1st and 6th PCs are
area se, area worst, and radius worst, which were reported
previously by [20] as being effective for classifying malignant
records. Note that, area worst actually has a quadratic re-
lation with radius worst, our model identified it as a linear
relation, which is a good approximation in a small range of
radius. The first four records, on the other hand, do not
have large projection values on PCs related to area features.
They were detected by PCs related to symmetry, fractal di-
mension, and compactness features, which clearly indicates
another type of malignant records.
The loading matrix of the abnormal PCs obtained by
JSPCA on Breast-Cancer is shown in Figure 8. The relevent
features are radius mean, concavity mean, area se, fractal
dimension se, perimeter worst, and compactness worst. As
we can see, JSPCA cannot tell the different causes of in-
dividual anomalies. The decision tree obtained on Breast-
Cancer is shown in Figure 9. Our ASPCA-BG model de-
tected 10 true positives, 18 false positives, and 339 true neg-
atives (shown on the root node in red, yellow, and green,
respectively) with the chosen SPE threshold. The tree used
concavity mean to separate positive and negative samples.
However, the attribute concavity mean is orthogonal to the
abnormal subspace obtained by our ASPCA-BGmodel, which
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Figure 8: Loading matrix of abnormal PCs obtained
by JSPCA on Breast-Cancer
concavity_mean
0.20823
10/18/339
area_se
0.200598
3/8/337
7/10/2
3/3/0…
0/5/337
Figure 9: Decision tree on Breast-Cancer
Table 7: Signatures on KDD99
# in Type/ Important
Type # in Group Components
neptune[DoS]
500/500
481/484
2L, 9H, 10H
11H, 12H, 14H
smurf[DoS]
493/500
472/472 1H, 3L, 8H, 16H
teardrop[DoS]
496/500
393/393 18H
satan[Probe]
500/500
444/444 2L, 3H, 6H, 8H
portsweep[Probe]
354/500
175/175 6H, 7L
ipsweep[Probe]
217/500
104/109 1H, 19H
warezclient[R2L]
974/1020
272/395 15H, 20H
332/339 4L, 5H, 6L
237/292 4L, 5H
guess-passwd[R2L]
53/53
48/121 4H, 5H
buffer-overflow[U2R]
30/30
7/7 5H, 24H
means it is not the feature based on which our ASPCA-BG
model detects anomalies. Hence, using decision trees to in-
terpret results of a subspace-based model, such as ours, may
lead to misleading interpretations.
KDD99: With the given SPE threshold, our ASPCA-
BG model detected 4397 true positives on KDD99. Al-
though our model is intended to analyze individual anoma-
lies, we can also summarize interpretations of similar anoma-
lies to make our discussion easier. We used a simple way
to generate signatures on whether an anomaly has low (≤
−
√
SPEthreshold/2), or high (≥
√
SPEthreshold/2) pro-
jection values on the set of abnormal PCs. Then anomalies
were grouped according to their signatures, so that the com-
ponents in the signature of each group is common for most
of the anomalies in the group.
In Table 7, we listed some major signatures found by the
above method. Actually, for most of the cases, we can as-
sociate each signature group with an anomaly type quite
well. The two numbers listed for each anomaly type are the
number of detected anomalies by our model and the number
of total anomalies of this type, respectively. The two num-
bers listed for each signature group are the number of the
anomalies of this type and the total number of anomalies in
the group, respectively. Some anomaly types only have one
main corresponding signature groups, whereas we identified
three main signature groups for warezclient[R2L]. For the
ith PC, iL and iH represent low and high projection val-
ues on it, respectively. Finally, the components appeared in
these signatures are shown in Table 8.
Table 8: Components on KDD99
Index Components
1 0.8906 protocol type + 0.3658 logged in
2 0.9949 same srv rate
3 0.9958 diff srv rate
4
0.9520 dst bytes
- 0.2222 logged in
5
0.7722 dst host same srv rate
- 0.6286 dst host srv count
6 0.9466 dst host diff srv rate
7 0.9714 duration
8 0.9995 count
9 0.9716 flag
10 0.9984 dst host serror rate
11 0.9981 srv serror rate
12 0.9981 serror rate
14 0.9985 dst host srv serror rate
15 0.9997 is guest login
16 0.9994 srv count
18 0.9996 wrong fragment
19 0.9970 dst host srv diff host rate
20 0.9999 hot
24 1 root shell
From Table 7, we can see that the signatures for different
anomaly types varied a lot, from which we often can find
the components that are consistent with the nature of each
anomaly type. For example, smurf[DoS] attacks are also
known as popular form of DoS packet floods, which turn
out to have high srv count and count values (i.e., 16H and
8H). Teardrop[DoS] attacks try to break the host by send-
ing mangled IP fragments, which led to high wrong fragment
values (i.e., 18H). We can see similar trends for Probe at-
tacks too. For example, ipsweep[Probe] attacks sweep differ-
ent hosts (IPs) to find cracks for hacking (i.e., 19H), whereas
portsweep[Probe] attacks try to visit different service (i.e.,
6H) and short connection duration (i.e., 7L). Buffer over-
flow[U2R] attackers try to gain the root authority on the
host, and 24H indicates that the user has logged into the
server with root shell. Warezclient[R2L] attackers try to
download files in forbidden directories from the FTP servers.
Our interpretation is consistent with [18] as logged in with
low dst bytes (i.e., 4L), is guest login (i.e., 15H) and high
hot values (i.e., 20H).
The results obtained by JSPCA are shown in Table 1. The
selected features by JSPCA are more general and similar for
all categories. Some of the important features for specific
attacks are missing too, for instance, root shell for User-2-
Root[U2R] attacks and hot and is guest login for R2L at-
tacks as mentioned in [18].
We show the decision tree obtained on KDD99 in Fig-
ure 10. The features captured by the decision tree are con-
sistent with the components discovered by our ASPCA-BG
model to a large extent. For example, low same srv rate was
chosen to detect neptune and satan DoS attackers, which is
the same as using 2L in our model to detect the same at-
tacks. Similarly, high protocol type values (i.e., using ICMP
protocol) was chosen to detect ipsweep and smurf attack-
ers (detected by 1H in our model). Low dst host srv count
with high hot values is an important character of warez-
client and guess-passed attacks (identical to 5H and 20H in
our model). An interesting observation on the decision tree
in Figure 10 is that a node on the tree will stop splitting
as soon as the samples in the node are mostly positive or
same_srv_rate
-0.1546
4421/6277/91774
protocol_type
0.7155
3296/3904/91674
1125/2373/100
neptune(498)
portsweep(100)
satan(499)
1123/596/498
ipsweep(388)
smurf(493)
dst_host_srv_count
-0.4156
2173/3308/91176
82/868/77759
back(22)
warezclient(55)
hot
0.01226
2091/2440/13417
454/366/50
guess_passwe(52)
warezclient(301)
…
1637/2073/13367
Figure 10: Decision tree on KDD99
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Figure 11: Selection on the number of normal PCs
negative ones. For example, the left child node of the root
in Figure 10 stopped splitting with anomalies from differ-
ent attack types, in which case, our model can provide more
information on the differences of the these attack types.
5.4 Parameter Selection
Our ASPCA models has two parameters to select: the
number of abnormal PCs and the coefficient λ on sparsity.
We know that PCA-based anomaly detection methods are
sensitive to the number of PCs [17]. We plotted the detec-
tion accuracy (in terms of Area Under ROC Curve (AUC))
with different number of abnormal PCs on Breast-Cancer
(with λ = 5) and KDD99 (λ = 100) in Figure 11. We
selected 20 normal PCs (i.e., 10 abnormal PCs) for Breast-
Cancer data and 6 normal PCs (i.e., 35 abnormal PCs),
for KDD99 data, to achieve the highest AUC values for our
baseline method PCA, to make the comparisons on detec-
tion accuracy fair.
The coefficient λ is a trade-off between the sparsity and
the additional variance on components. With less additional
variance, the variances on the whole detection space for vari-
ous ASPCA models are closer to the one of PCA. We showed
the variance, sparsity (valued by ||V ||1,1) and AUC values
obtained by varying the value of λ on KDD99 and Breast-
Cancer in Table 9 for ASPCA-FG and ASPCA-BG. We can
see that our models are not very sensitive to λ in terms of
AUC, and we selected λ = 5 for Breast-Cancer, λ = 100 for
KDD99 for moderate sparsity and variance. The trends are
similar for ASPCA-F and ASPCA-B, which were omitted
due to space constraints. We selected the same λ values for
ASPCA-F and ASPCA-B, as in ASPCA-FG and ASPCA-
BG, respectively.
Table 9: Selection on λ
ASPCA-FG ASPCA-BG
λ ||V ||1,1 Variance AUC ||V ||1,1 Variance AUC
0 97.33 21518 0.963 97.33 21518 0.963
10 44.38 21524 0.963 44.59 21523 0.963
50 43.52 21627 0.962 43.97 21589 0.964
100 42.77 21873 0.960 43.04 21735 0.964
500 41.04 23673 0.956 40.67 22997 0.967
(a) KDD99
ASPCA-FG ASPCA-BG
λ ||V ||1,1 Variance AUC ||V ||1,1 Variance AUC
0 34.23 1.2728 0.959 34.23 1.2728 0.959
1 26.68 14.2012 0.903 14.95 6.2777 0.950
5 16.50 20.8308 0.963 12.31 20.2968 0.982
10 12.81 30.8123 0.985 10 57.0009 0.966
50 10 57.0009 0.966 10 57.0009 0.966
(b) Breast-Cancer
6. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Traditional PCA-based anomaly detection models are not
suitable for anomaly interpretation, limiting its usage in the
domains where interpretation is essential. In this paper, we
found that the sparsity and orthogonality of the loading vec-
tors are the keys to anomaly interpretation, and proposed
an interpretable PCA-based anomaly detection model, the
ASPCA model. We designed forward and backward ASPCA
models and evaluated them on two real world datasets. Our
model achieved similar or even better anomaly detection
performance as the traditional PCA model, and provided
meaningful interpretation for individual anomalies. Our fu-
ture works will focus on three directions: 1) how to improve
efficiency on high dimensional datasets; 2) how to extend
our model to robust PCA for better detection performance;
3) how to extend our model to kernel PCA.
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